Aryan D’Rozario
Aryan D’Rozario is a programs coordinator at the East-West Center in Washington, DC. He received his Master of Science degree from the University of Oxford, where he read Modern South Asian Studies.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of the Pacific Islands Development Program or the East-West Center.
Featured photo courtesy of Laurentiu Morariu via Unsplash.
The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States defines India as “a … leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean …, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development.” An under-appreciated example of India’s willingness to expand its diplomatic, commercial, and even security footprint is India’s outreach in the Pacific Islands.
The Pacific is emerging as an expanded arena of competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the United States hasn’t anchored its predominance in the region. The recent security pact between the PRC and the Solomon Islands initiated particularly intense concern with the possibility of Chinese military deployments.
India, even as a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), is charting its own course in the Pacific, using historic bilateral relations, and through old and new multilateral forums.
Leveraging Pre-existing India-Pacific Islands Connections for Better Defense
India’s historic relationship with the Pacific Islands region is rooted in colonialism. India is a member of the British-led Commonwealth of Nations, and has the fastest growing Commonwealth economy. The Commonwealth boasts a strong network of membership in the Indo-Pacific: Australia, New Zealand, Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Vanuatu are members. Fiji was a former member. Yet, until recently, India’s foreign policy was primarily concentrated towards the West in an effort to acquire economic assistance and technology. The rise of Chinese aggression on the Indo-China border, closer ties with the United States, and a weakening Russia have led India to expand its horizons.
It is quite surprising that Britain’s 2023 UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific report makes no mention of the Commonwealth. Of course, the Commonwealth has in recent times focused less on defense and politics and more on mutual values such as language and democracy. These values may sound familiar to those sitting in New Delhi, who pride themselves on their democratic credentials in contrast to the PRC. Britain’s 2023 report demonstrates that historical amnesia is not always the best path forward. Britain may be ignoring their Commonwealth partners in the Pacific, but India should not. A revamped Commonwealth with India as a leading member can do more to expand cooperation in the Pacific.
India is also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded by countries who were unwilling to formally align with the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. ASEAN has observer status. Arguments can perhaps be made that the Commonwealth and NAM are outdated organizations with little relevancy in today’s post-Cold War configuration. Yet, India’s foreign policy has consistently shown its insistence on being independent. Historical tensions have only discouraged India from placing all its apples in one basket. The Commonwealth and NAM, therefore, are advantageous for India as they provide alternative platforms, where India finds itself as a main player.
Modi Leading the Way to the Pacific
Narendra Modi’s Act East Policy has led India to focus more on the Pacific. Modi hosted the third iteration of the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) in 2023 in Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea (PNG). He was given a grand welcome by PNG’s prime minister, was awarded PNG’s highest state honor, and was shoulder-to-shoulder with the 14 members of the FIPIC: the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. India’s engagement in the region is now seen by New Delhi as critical.
The interesting coincidence is that the India-led forum is home to six Commonwealth members and all three Pacific members of NAM. This is significant, and an important omission from traditional approaches by India’s foreign ministry to the region. India’s leadership in the region is certainly bilateral and multilateral, but it is also historical and cultural. Fiji, for example, boasts an Indian diaspora population of 37.6%.
Modi’s promise of development assistance through “South-South” cooperation, loan assistance, and capacity building is critical given the PRC’s push to also expand its network in the region. India’s independent approach works in tandem with the interests of the United States. Washington’s recent negotiations to renew the Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements were necessary considering America’s Indo-Pacific policy. All three COFA states are also members of India’s pacific island forum.
Challenges Ahead for the “Indian Way”
However, problems persist. India’s Act East Policy is rather new, starting only in 2014. A stronger Indian diplomatic presence and more Indian tourism and economic assistance in the Pacific region is vital to keep up the momentum.
Leveraging historical ties gives India the option of engaging without the presence of Western powers, and its ability to connect with the region as a country borne out of colonialism, strategically independent, and a “voice for the Global South” has resonated well. India’s focus on assistance in climate change initiatives and healthcare (through India’s vaccine diplomacy program) has led the country to develop stronger bonds in the region. Choosing the “third way,” the Indian way, may keep everyone reasonably content.